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NOTE
THIRSTING FOR EQUAL PROTECTION: THE LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS OF MUNICIPAL WATER ACCESS IN
KENNEDY V, CITY OF ZANESVILLE AND THE NEED
FOR FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENTS
PRACTICING UNLAWFUL RACE DISCRIMINATION
Jon Izak Monger+
The sound of rain on the roof is music to Jerry Kennedy's ears. Kennedy's
appreciation is practical-for fifty-four years of his life, Kennedy did not have
running water in his home and he and his family relied on rainwater to do their
laundry.
Kennedy lives outside Zanesville, a city at the confluence of the Muskingum
2
and Licking Rivers in the rolling hills of southeast Ohio. Zanesville first
installed municipal water outside its limits in the 1930s, and in the 1950s a city
ordinance allowed water to be run along Adamsville Road and Langan Lane.
These roads intersect with Coal Run Road4---"a one-lane strip of blacktop" 5
and namesake for the historically African American neighborhood of
approximately twenty-five homes.
6
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2010, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.A., 2003, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. The author would like to thank Professor
Susanna Fischer for her support and tremendous insight; Judge James J. Brady for his example of
principled justice; and, above all, his family for placing him in a position to succeed and instilling
in him a love of the Ohio hills.
1. Claire Suddath, Making Water a Matter of Race, TIME, July 14, 2008, available at
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1822455,00.html.
2. City of Zanesville, Ohio, http://www.coz.org/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2010) (noting that
Amelia Earhart called Zanesville "the most recognizable city in the country" because of the Y-
shaped bridge spanning its rivers).
3. Kennedy v. City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d 456, 464 (S.D. Ohio 2007).
4. Google Maps, http://maps.google.com (enter "Langan Lane Zanesville OH") (last
visited Feb. 13, 2010).
5. Randy Ludlow, Racism Ruled, Jury Finds, COLUMBUs DISPATCH, July 11, 2008, at Al.
6. City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 463. Coal Run is an unincorporated area outside
the Zanesville city limits. Michelle W. Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty, and
Exclusion at the Urban Fringe, 55 UCLA L. REv. 1095, 1110 (2008) (examining legal challenges
facing residents of unincorporated urban areas). The homes on Coal Run Road consist of trailers,
mobile, and modular homes. Ludlow, supra note 5.
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African American citizens in Coal Run-including the Kennedy family-
unsuccessfully requested access to the municipal water supply for decades.7
Various government entities denied their requests while simultaneously
granting access to white residents on the same street,8 causing African
American residents in Coal Run to live without a reliable supply of water.9 To
meet their needs, African American residents collected rainwater, melted
snow, or purchased water.' 0 But these alternatives presented health and safety
concerns: rainwater "was fouled with crawfish, snakes, and rats [and t]he
residue from old coal deposits .. .sometimes could leave the water as red as
blood."" Meanwhile, white neighbors living within 200 yards of Coal Run
enjoyed access to unlimited running water, enabling them to water their lawns
and fill their hot tubs.
12
The odyssey of Kennedy v. City of Zanesville began on November 13, 2003,
when Coal Run residents Cynthia Hairston, Jerry Kennedy, and Richard
Kennedy joined the Fair Housing Advocates Association to file suit against the
City of Zanesville and Washington Township in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio. 13 In early 2004, after the lawsuit had
begun, the City extended municipal water to Coal Run. 14 On July 11, 2008, a
jury handed down a verdict holding the City and county liable for race
discrimination. 15
This Note will examine the circumstances and legal implications of Kennedy
v. City of Zanesville. In Part I, this Note explores available remedies for such
discrimination by discussing monetary damages, injunctive relief, and a type of
7. See City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 496 (detailing the attempts of Coal Run
residents to obtain access to municipal water); Dirk Johnson, For a Recently Plumbed
Neighborhood, Validation in a Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2008, at A15 (observing the city
and county failed to grant water access to plaintiffs for more than forty-five years).
8. See City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 497; Ludlow, supra note 5 (announcing that
nearby white homes had municipal water access but that residents of Coal Run did not); see also
Johnson, supra note 7.
9. See James Dao, Ohio Town's Water at Last Runs Past a Color Line, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
17, 2004, at Al ("The [Ohio Civil Rights] Comission found on Coal Run Road, none of the 17
black or mixed-race homes had city water service, while two white homes did.").
10. Id.; see also Anderson, supra note 6, at 1110-11.
11. Johnson, supra note 7. Additionally, water storage units attracted parasites, snails, and
insects; as a result, residents were forced to treat the water with chemicals. Anderson, supra note
6, at 1111.
12. Dao, supra note 9. Facing similar hardship, minorities in the Buckhorn/Perry Hill
neighborhood of Mebane, North Carolina were unable to get a permit for replacement water and
septic systems when well water became contaminated, despite being located across the street
from a large trucking station with working sewer and water service. Anderson, supra note 6, at
1107-08.
13. Complaint, City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d 456 (No. 2:03cv1047).
14. City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 469.
15. Kathy Thompson, Appeal to be Filed in Coal Run Lawsuit, ZANESVILLE TIMES
RECORDER, Aug. 2, 2008, at IA.
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government oversight known as preclearance. Part II outlines the litigation
timeline of events. In Part III, this Note underscores the significance of City of
Zanesville by presenting demographic information about the surrounding area
and asserting that the recent date of the litigation is a reminder of continuing
race discrimination in our government and society. Part IV applies established
legal standards to determine the extent that the denial of water service to Coal
Run minorities was racially motivated. Notwithstanding the limits imposed by
the incomplete record-typical of a jury case-this section will conclude the
jury in City of Zanesville was correct in finding discrimination. Finally, this
Note concludes that Kennedy v. City of Zanesville is a straightforward case
which correctly applied substantive civil rights law; however, the law must go
further to prevent future racism by applying strict federal oversight to
jurisdictions practicing race discrimination.
I. REVISITING CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY
A. Were Coal Run Residents Victims of Intentional Discrimination? A Look at
Federal and State Laws that Require Intent to Discriminate
City of Zanesville directly implicates fundamental rights guaranteed in the
Thirteenth 16 and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and their
statutory enactments.17 The Thirteenth Amendment states: "[n]either slavery
nor involuntary servitude... shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction."' 8 Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that "[n]o State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."19
Plaintiffs in City of Zanesville claimed violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1982, 1983, and 2000d 2--civil rights statutes grounded in the Thirteenth and
16. Lewis v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 440 F. Supp. 949, 964 (D. Md. 1977) ("[S]ection 2 of
the [Thirteenth] Amendment, the Enabling Clause, empowered Congress 'to pass all laws
necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States."'
(quoting United States v. Stanley (The Civil Rights Cases), 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883))).
17. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983 (2006) (articulating statutory text embodying the
principles of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments). Both 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1982
were "originally enacted in the Civil Rights Act of 1866." Lewis, 440 F. Supp. at 964 (explaining
that §§ 1981 and 1982 are based on the Thirteenth Amendment while § 1983 is derived from the
Fourteenth Amendment); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) (applying the Equal Protection
Clause to programs and activities receiving federal assistance).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
20. See Kennedy v. City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d 456, 476 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (listing
the causes of action claimed by plaintiffs); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) (codifying a
method for enforcing principles of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Jack M. Beermann, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation: Fifty Years Later, 34
CONN. L. REv. 981, 982-83 (2002) (discussing §§ 1931-1983 and providing an account of the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the civil rights statutes).
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Fourteenth Amendments. 21 For example, § 1981(a) states: "[a]ll persons ...
shall have the same right ... to the full and equal benefit of all laws ... and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens." 22 Similarly, § 1982 instructs that
"[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same right ... to... hold and
convey real and personal property." 23 The right to sue for violations of these
rights is granted in § 1983, which specifies in pertinent part that "[e]very
person who . . . subjects . . . any citizen of the United States . . . to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law."
24
Analogously, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d affirms "[n]o person.., shall, on the ground
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from . . . or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.
25
26Each of these statutes requires a showing of discriminatory intent.26 Thus,
the issue of whether denials of utility service were racially motivated is central
27to plaintiffs' claims in City of Zanesville.
21. See Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437-38 (1968) (noting that § 1982 is
based on the Thirteenth Amendment); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d
836, 856 (5th Cir. 1966) ("Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... was ... appropriate and
proper legislation under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments .... "); Hague v. Comm. for
Indus. Org., 101 F.2d 774, 788 (3d Cir. 1939) (observing that 42 U.S.C. § 1983, originally
codified at 8 U.S.C. § 43, was "enacted originally to enforce recognition by the states of the civil
rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment"); Gourdine v. Ellis, 435 F. Supp. 882, 885 (D.S.C.
1977) ("42 U.S.C. § 1981 is based upon the Thirteenth ... Amendment .... "). Plaintiffs also
claimed a violation of an Ohio civil rights statute. City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 476.
Ohio law states: "[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice ... [f]or any person to ... deny
or make unavailable housing accommodations because of race, color, . . . ancestry,... or national
origin." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(H)(1) (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2009).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2006).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2006).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006).
26. See Cruz v. Town of Cicero, No. 99-cv-3286, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11598, at *33
(N.D. 111. July 28, 1999) ("Unlike the Fair Housing Act and other anti-discrimination legislation,
§ 1981 requires a showing of purposeful discrimination."). "Like § 1981, § 1982 also requires a
showing of discriminatory intent." Id. at *34. Similarly, under § 1983 "in order to prevail,
plaintiffs must establish racially discriminatory intent or purpose; a mere showing of
discriminatory effect is not enough." Clark v. Mann, 562 F.2d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir. 1977). For
claims filed under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, "the Supreme Court has
made clear that a private individual must allege intentional discrimination, not disparate impact."
Almendares v. Palmer, 284 F. Supp. 2d 799, 802 (N.D. Ohio 2003).
27. City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 497-98 (holding that the plaintiffs established a
prima facie case of racial discrimination thus forming a presumption that the city's actions were
racially motivated).
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B. The Fair Housing Act: No Showing of Intent Required
Plaintiffs in City of Zanesville also alleged a violation of the Fair Housing
Act,28 which does not require a showing of discriminatory intent in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.29 Instead, the court evaluates a
Fair Housing Act claim by examining the discriminatory effect of an action.
30
Therefore, courts require plaintiffs suing under §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, and
2000d to establish discriminatory intent W-a standard not imposed on those
bringing suit under the Fair Housing Act.
32
C. Establishing Discrimination in Municipal Service Equalization Cases: The
McDonnell Douglas Framework and the Progeny of Hawkins v. Shaw
Where claims of discriminatory treatment are based on indirect evidence of
discrimination, 33 the Sixth Circuit applies a three-step, burden-shifting
framework that was articulated in McDonnell Douglas v. Green.34 The first
step of McDonnell Douglas requires a plaintiff to establish, through evidence,
a prima facie case that raises "an inference of discrimination. '3  Next, the
28. See City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 476.
29. See, e.g., Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 574-75 (6th Cir. 1986) (declining to
consider discriminatory intent because it was not as significant as the other factors used to find a
violation of the Fair Housing Act). In Arthur, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that a consideration of
discriminatory intent would equate to giving plaintiffs "half credit" where they did not produce
enough evidence to prove race discrimination. Id. at 575.
30. Id at 574-75. The Sixth Circuit held that "a violation of [the Fair Housing Act] can be
established by a showing of discriminatory effect without a showing of discriminatory intent"
based on the following factors: "(1) how strong is the plaintiff's showing of discriminatory effect;
. ..(2) what is the defendant's interest in taking the action complained of; and (3) does the
plaintiff seek to compel [action by the defendant] . .. or merely to restrain the defendant from
interfering ... ." Id. at 574-75 (quoting Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights,
558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977)).
31. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
32. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
33. See Leslie M. Kerns, Comment, Aka v. Washington Hospital Center: Why the Debate
over Pretext Ended with Hicks, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1625, 1628 n.15 (1999) ("Direct evidence of
intentional discrimination is proof that the defendant's action was motivated by a discriminatory
animus-i.e., based on race, sex, or religion. For example, a statement about race in the context of
the adverse action would suffice as direct evidence of discrimination."). In contrast,
circumstantial evidence "shows that the defendant was more likely than not motivated by
discrimination," and "includes how the employer treated the plaintiff in the past or past treatment
of other employees in the same protected class." Id.
34. See, e.g., Bell v. Ohio State Univ., 351 F.3d 240, 252-53 (6th Cir. 2003), affd, Bell v.
Ohio State Bd. of Trs., No. 06AP- 1174, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 2542 (Ohio Ct. App. June 7,
2007) (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to evaluate race and gender discrimination
claims brought by a dismissed medical student); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973) (providing a three-step, burden-shifting analysis for discrimination
claims relying on indirect evidence).
35. Kennedy v. City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d 456, 493 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (citing
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802). Courts have applied different standards over time
to determine whether a plaintiff has proven a prima facie case of discrimination. See, e.g.,
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burden shifts to the defendant to provide a "legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for the challenged actions."6 Finally, the evidentiary burden shifts
back to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's proffered explanation is
"merely a 'pre text' for unlawful discrimination." 37
In 1971, a successful model for using evidentiary support to prove
discrimination emerged in the leading case of Hawkins v. Town of Shaw.38 In
Hawkins, African American citizens in Mississippi alleged race-based disparity
in street paving and lighting, sewer systems, water drainage, and fire
hydrants.39 The plaintiffs successfully established a prima facie case of
discrimination by presenting statistical differences in the administration of
Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286, 1292 (5th Cir. 1971) ("[W]e have not . . . been
guided by a statutory set of standards or regulations clearly defining how many paved streets or
what kind of sewerage system a town like Shaw should have."), aft'd, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir.
1972) (per curiam); Middlebrook v. Bartlett, 341 F. Supp. 2d 950, 959-60 (W.D. Tenn. 2003)
(holding that when analyzing a claim of discrimination under the Fair Housing Act, the court
must apply the three-part burden-shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas).
36. City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 493 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at
802).
37. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804).
38. Hawkins, 437 F.2d 1286; see also Sten-Erik Hoidal, Note, Returning to the Roots of
Environmental Justice: Lessons from the Inequitable Distribution of Municipal Services, 88
MINN. L. REV. 193, 196-97 (2003) (embracing Hawkins as "[t]he paradigmatic lawsuit of [a]
movement" against the "inequitable distribution of municipal services").
39. Hawkins, 437 F.2d at 1288. Municipal-service equalization cases comprise just one
type of discrimination against minorities by governments. Another type, for example, is
"environmental racism," which refers to "distinct and identifiable racially-based conduct resulting
in an inequitable distribution of environmental burdens on minority communities." Jill E. Evans,
Challenging the Racism in Environmental Racism: Redefining the Concept of Intent, 40 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1219, 1221 (1998). An example of environmental racism is the disproportionate selection
of minority communities for the placement of waste-treatment facilities and landfills. See id. at
1247. The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) and various private
organizations have conducted studies on the correlation between the location of waste facilities
and the racial composition of nearby communities. Id. One private study identified race as the
strongest indicator of the location for waste facilities. Id. at 1247-48 (discussing a study
conducted by the Commission for Racial Justice of the United Church of Christ and noting that
the study concluded "that race was the single best predictor of where hazardous waste facilities
were located"). In 1990, the National Law Journal published findings indicating that both the
penalties issued by the Environmental Protection Agency for hazardous waste contamination and
the scope of cleanup efforts varied based on the race of the surrounding community. Id at 1249
("The study reported that at sites located in white communities, agency action was faster, clean up
remedies were superior, and penalties imposed on waste generators were stiffer than at sites
located in minority communities."). In addition to the superiority of cleanup efforts in white
communities, the National Law Journal found that penalties imposed on violating companies
were found to be 500% greater in areas with a high concentration of white residents. Id. Overall,
these studies have found that minority communities excessively shoulder the burden of
environmental risks and dangers. Id. at 1252. Litigants claiming environmental racism, however,
have generally failed. Id. at 1277. The plaintiffs have had difficulty proving discriminatory
intent due to the increasingly "less overt" forms of racism. Id. at 1279.
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municipal services and arguing that geographic segregation led to a pattern of
discrimination.4 °
This statistical approach became a model for plaintiffs in subsequent
municipal-service equalization cases. In 1978, plaintiffs in Florida alleged
race-based discrimination in the city's road paving, recreational facilities, and
water-distribution facility. 42  In Johnson v. City of Arcadia, the court
introduced three requirements necessary to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination in municipal services suits: "(1) existence of racially
identifiable neighborhoods in the municipality; (2) substantial inferiority in the
quality or quantity of the municipal services and facilities provided in the
[minority] neighborhood; and, (3) proof of intent or motive."4  The plaintiffs
met this intent-based standard by using the Hawkins evidentiary model;44 the
court inferred discriminatory intent based on evidence of segregated housing
45
and statistical inequalities in city services.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also followed
Hawkins in Dowdell v. Apopka, a Florida case where the court announced a
series of factors to determine whether there is a strong enough correlation
between race and service inequities to require a finding of discriminatory
intent.46  The Dowdell court found the following factors to be indicative of
40. Hawkins, 437 F.2d at 1288. The Hawkins court restated its commitment to the theory
that "'figures speak and when they do, [clourts listen."' Id. at 1288 (quoting Brooks v. Beto, 366
F.2d 1, 9 (5th Cir. 1966)). In its analysis, the court relied on statistics showing almost complete
residential racial segregation, as well as statistics indicating that 98% of people living on unpaved
roads were African American. Id. at 1288. The court similarly noted that 99% of white residents
had access to a sanitary sewer system, while close to 20% of the African American population did
not. Id. at 1290; Hoidal, supra note 38, at 197 (discussing the statistics cited in Hawkins and
relied on by the plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination).
41. Hoidal, supra note 38, at 197.
42. Johnson v. City of Arcadia, 450 F. Supp. 1363, 1368 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
43. Id. at 1379.
44. The Johnson court noted decades of historical discrimination against African Americans
by city officials, and cited statistical disparities in the opinion and in elaborate appendices. Id. at
1369-77, 1381-91. The statistical data showed that white residents were two-and-a-half times
more likely than African American residents to have their street paved. Id. at 1370. The court
also denounced the fact that water lines underneath the African American community were
smaller in diameter than those serving the white community; consequently, fire hydrants in the
African American neighborhoods did not have sufficient water pressure. Id. at 1376. The court
ruled that no major improvements could be made in white areas until the requisite improvements
were made in African American areas. Id. at 1380.
45. Johnson, 450 F. Supp. at 1378-79 ("Statistical proof coupled with historical showing of
broad-based racial discrimination satisfied Plaintiffs' burden of proving the intent requirement
.... .).
46. Dowdell v. Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1184-86 (11th Cir. 1983). Plaintiffs in Dowdell
intentionally modeled their complaint after Hawkins and Johnson. Id. at 1184. A similar fact
pattern lent itself to such emulation-in Dowdell, African American residents sued the city over
the unequal provision of road paving, water drainage and distribution, sewers, and recreational
facilities. Id.
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discriminatory intent: "the magnitude of the disparity.. . , the legislative and
administrative pattern of decision-making," and whether or not an unequal
provision of services was a "foreseeable outcome" of the city's actions.47 In
addition, the Dowdell court applied a "cumulative evidence" test, establishing
that discriminatory intent did not mandate evidence that racial subversion be
48the only goal. Rather, the court concluded "[i]t is . . . the cumulative
evidence of action and inaction which objectively manifests discriminatory
intent."
49
Florida plaintiffs in Ammons v. Dade City also modeled their suit after
Hawkins.50 Again the court applied the Dowdell factors, 51 but also added to
their analysis of discriminatory intent an inquiry into whether the government
had knowledge of the inequality.
52
In addition to African American plaintiffs, other minority groups have
applied the Hawkins factors with success.53 This case law pattern establishes
47. Id. at 1186. The court indicated that "'actions having foreseeable and anticipated
disparate impact are relevant evidence to prove the ultimate fact, forbidden purpose."' Id.
(quoting Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979)).
48. Id. at 1185 (citing McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1973)).
49. Id.
50. Ammons v. Dade City, 783 F.2d 982, 983 (11 th Cir. 1986). Plaintiffs alleged that Dade
City, the mayor, and city commissions violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments by
providing unequal municipal services to the African American community in road paving, road
resurfacing, road maintenance, and storm-water drainage. Id. The district court's analysis
modeled Hawkins, first identifying a pattern of residential segregation in Dade City, then
reviewing statistical evidence for disparities in municipal-service provision. Id. at 983, 985.
51. Id. at 988. The Ammons court found that the great magnitude in service inequality was
"explicable only on racial grounds," noting that a lesser allocation of funds to the African
American community would "lead to the foreseeable outcome of a deprived black residential
community." Id. In making its determination, the court relied on "a multitude of documentary
and testimonial evidence covering practically every aspect of municipal conduct in Dade City
throughout its history." Id.
52. See id. Evaluating the knowledge factor, the court determined that the defendants knew
of the disparity based on the obvious nature of the service discrepancies. Id. ("A brief visit to the
black community makes obvious the need for street paving and storm water drainage control.").
53. See, e.g., United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493
F.2d 799, 808, 812 (5th Cir. 1974). In United Farmworkers, Delray Beach-a city in Palm Beach
County, Florida-refused to grant a permit to a subsidized housing project for Hispanic and
African American farm workers to connect to municipal water and sewer lines. Id. at 800-01.
Applying Hawkins, the court identified geographic and racial segregation and discussed the City's
past history of zoning decisions against minorities. Id. at 808. The court noted previous city
council meetings where proposals to build similar housing projects on the same parcel of land
were discussed and where the council ultimately determined that the high population density that
would accompany such a development was "incompatible with the City's 'wishes."' Id at 810.
Consequently, the court concluded the City's previous and current actions had a cumulative effect
of restricting low-income housing to one area of the city, bolstering segregation, and discouraging
construction of affordable housing. Id. Comparably, the court found the present action of
granting zoning exceptions to white citizens while denying the same exceptions to minorities was
a violation of Sections 1981, 1982, 1983, and the Fair Housing Act. Id. at 808. The court granted
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that plaintiffs in municipal-service equalization cases can successfully prove a
prima facie case of discrimination when they cite statistical differences and
argue that physical and political segregation created a tradition of inequitable
treatment toward minorities.54
D. Compensating for Discrimination: Monetary Damages and Tort Liability
for Constitutional Violations
The United States Supreme Court endorses the award of damages as a
remedy for violations of civil rights derived from both the Constitution and
federal statutes. 55  Specifically, courts have held that § 1982, protecting. • 56
property rights, permits the award of compensatory damages where race
discrimination occurs in real estate transactions, and accounts for humiliation
resulting from the discrimination. 57 Courts also award compensatory damages
for violations of § 1983, protecting individual rights, and have historically
interpreted coverage of the statute broadly. 58 In order to recover, however,
courts insist that damages must be tied to actual injury, 59 rather than the
the farm workers injunctive relief, ordering the city "to allow the farmworkers' housing project to
tie into the City's water and sewer system." Id. at 812.
54. See Hoidal, supra note 38, at 197-99. Commentators have similarly observed
discriminatory practices in the zoning and annexation policies of local governments. See, e.g.,
Cedar Grove Institute for Sustainable Communities, Fighting Institutionalized Discrimination and
Exclusion of Minorities, http://home.mindspring.com/-mcmoss/cedargrove/id t1 .html [hereinafter
Cedar Grove] (last visited Feb. 13, 2010) ("We are finding that it is common practice for
governments of small and medium-sized towns to use their powers of annexation, zoning,
provision of infrastructure and public services, long-term planning, and maximization of tax base
to exclude minority and low-income communities from full participation in the town's benefits
and governance."). Commentators refer to this policy of annexing cities in avoidance of low-
income minority areas as "municipal underbounding." Anderson, supra note 6, at 1113. The
Cedar Grove Institute for Sustainable Communities has developed a program relying on
geographic information systems (GIS) to overlay evidence of discriminatory application of
government services with maps indicating the racial and socioeconomic makeup of the region.
Cedar Grove, supra.
55. See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986) (discussing
compensatory damages a as remedy for injuries created by the violation of a constitutional right);
see also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 248 (1978) (holding that actual injury is required in order
for compensatory damages to be awarded).
56. Compensatory damages are defined as: "[d]amages sufficient in amount to indemnify
the injured person for the loss suffered." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 444 (9th ed. 2009).
57. Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding that compensatory
damages are appropriate for humiliation in violation of § 1982 and commenting that
"[h]umiliation can be inferred from the circumstances as well as established by the testimony").
58. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 105 (1989) ("We have
repeatedly held that the coverage of [§ 1983] must be broadly construed."); Memphis Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 477 U.S. at 307-08 ("'[T]he basic purpose' of § 1983 damages is 'to compensate persons
for injuries that are caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights."' (quoting Carey v. Piphus,
435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978)) (emphasis omitted)).
59. See Kemner v. Hemphill, 199 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1265 (N.D. Fla. 2002) (citing Slicker v.
Jackson, 215 F.3d 1225, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000)) (explaining that actual injuries "include[]
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"abstract value of the constitutional right[s]" that may have been violated.6"
The practical effect of this distinction is that plaintiffs must first show that their
constitutional rights were violated, and then that the violation caused a
"compensable injury."6 1
The Fair Housing Act (FHA), in contrast, permits compensatory damages,
punitive damages, and injunctive relief.62 Like § 1982 and § 1983 damages,
FHA damages "are not limited to out-of-pocket losses but may include an
award for emotional distress and humiliation."63 In brief, monetary damages
are a familiar remedy for constitutional violations.
E. Injunctive Relief in Municipal-Service Equalization Cases
Injunctive64 relief is another frequent remedy in municipal-service
equalization cases. 65 In this regard, courts require a close link between the
emotional injury standing alone . . . [and] typically are physical, emotional, or fiscal in
character"). In the absence of actual injury, courts will permit the plaintiff to seek nominal
damages. Slicker, 215 F.3d at 1231 ("We have held unambiguously that a plaintiff whose
Constitutional rights are violated is entitled to nominal damages even if he suffered no
compensable injury.").
60. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist., 477 U.S. at 307-08 ("'Rights, constitutional and otherwise,
do not exist in a vacuum. Their purpose is to protect persons from injuries to particular interests
.... 'Where no injury was present, no 'compensatory' damages could be awarded." (quoting
Carey, 435 U.S. at 254)).
61. Carey, 435 U.S. at 255 (citing Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975)).
62. See Baumgardner v. Sec'y, United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 960 F.2d 572,
580 (6th Cir. 1992) (interpreting the Fair Housing Act through 42 U.S.C. § 3613 to "authorize[]
'actual and punitive damages' as well as injunctive relief' (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3613)).
63. Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380, 384 (10th Cir. 1973).
64. Injunctive is defined as: "[t]hat has the quality of directing or ordering; of or relating to
an injunction." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 56, at 800.
65. See, e.g., Ammons v. Dade City, 783 F.2d 982, 983-84 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (affirming an
injunction against the city prohibiting the provision of municipal services in the white
neighborhoods until those in the black neighborhoods were provided for equally); Dowdell v.
City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1184-85 (11th Cir. 1983) (affirming the lower court's order
enjoining the city "from initiating or constructing any new municipal services or improvements in
the white community until such time as the disparities in the black community facilities were
eliminated"); Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286, 1293 (5th Cir. 1971), affd, 461 F.2d
1171 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (condemning the town's actions and mandating a proposal to
eliminate discrimination in providing municipal services); Johnson v. City of Arcadia, 450 F.
Supp. 1363, 1368 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (enjoining the city from spending funds without court
permission and approving a plan to "equalize" municipal services in the black community);
Hadnott v. City of Prattville, 309 F. Supp. 967, 975 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (granting an injunction to
prohibit the city from offering municipal services on a basis of racial discrimination); Kennedy
Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669, 697-98 (W.D.N.Y. 1970) (ruling
that the city must not interfere with construction of a subdivision and must take affirmative action
to assist the building of the subdivision); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 304 F. Supp. 736,
737-38 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (instructing the housing authority to provide equal housing to African
American tenants), affid, 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970). But see Middlebrook v. City of Bartlett,
341 F. Supp. 2d 950, 959 n.8 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (admitting the existence of race discrimination
in violation of the Fair Housing Act but concluding injunctive relief was not appropriate because,
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constitutional violation and the judicial response, maintaining "that federal
court decrees must directly address and relate to the constitutional violation
itself."66
In Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit mandated that the town file a plan with the court explaining how
the town would cure its disparate provision of street paving, street lights,
sanitary sewers, fire hydrants, and water-drainage services. In Johnson v.
City of Arcadia, in addition to ordering improvements to minority residents'
water systems, recreation facilities, and streets, the court prohibited any
significant improvements to white communities until the City instituted
improvements in the minority community. The court in Dowdell v. City of
Apopka restricted the City's use of funds, ruling that the funds only be used
exclusively for improvements in the municipal services for the minority
community.6 9 Going even further, the lower court in Ammons v. Dade City
required the City to submit a plan to institute municipal improvements to the
minority community and retained jurisdiction of the case to ensure the
judgment was properly implemented. 7° These cases display the trend of courts
ruling to "cure the 'condition that offends the Constitution"' by granting
injunctive relief to municipal-service plaintiffs.7
F. Injunctive Relief on Steroids: Forced Compliance with Government
Procedures and the Preclearance Model of the Voting Rights Act
1. What is Preclearance? Background and Coverage
Where constitutional voting rights are threatened, Congress has gone beyond
the remedies discussed above by enacting laws with strict reporting and
monitoring requirements.72 A prominent example of such laws is the system of
"federal preclearance," which is required when states or municipalities with a
history of voting rights violations seek to alter voting procedures.
73
at the time of remedy, plaintiffs had been granted access to water), affid, 103 F. App'x 560 (6th
Cir. 2004).
66. Johnson, 450 F. Supp. at 1379 (citing Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 433 U.S. 267,
281-82 (1977)).
67. Hawkins, 437 F.2d at 1288, 1293.
68. Johnson, 450 F. Supp. at 1380.
69. Dowdell, 698 F.2d at 1184.
70. Ammons, 594 F. Supp. at 1306.
71. Johnson, 450 F. Supp. at 1378-79 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 1), 418 U.S.
717, 738 (1973)).
72. See, e.g., Berry v. Doles, 438 U.S. 190, 199-200 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring)
(discussing "how § 5, enacted to further the exercise of an important constitutional right, has been
judicially expanded to cover the most inconsequential change in any aspect of election
procedure").
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006) (requiring jurisdictions covered by the Voting Rights
Act to seek preclearance and explaining that preclearance can be obtained either by declaratory
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Specifically, § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 requires regulated
jurisdictions to seek prior approval for changes to their election laws. The
ultimate goal of this provision is oversight.75 The Court has observed that "the
purpose of § 5 is to establish procedures in which voting changes can be
scrutinized by a federal instrumentality before they become effective."
76
In recognition of the importance of voting rights, courts have interpreted the
preclearance statute broadly, determining that Congress intended for
preclearance to be followed when state laws affect voting in even an indirect or
slight manner.7 7 Courts determine whether an entity designated to perform a
government responsibility is subject to preclearance requirements by
considering federal and state law, in addition to the entity's authority and
responsibilities. 78 For example, the rule emerging from Supreme Court case
law indicates that a utility company providing general services normally paid
for by a municipality would be subject to preclearance requirements when
large projects must be approved by elections-thereby implicating voting-
judgment issued by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, or by approval
from the Attorney General); see also United States v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110, 119-20
(1978). The Court in Bd. of Comm'rs explained that this requirement applies to states that
"maintained any 'test or device' . . . and ... had voter registration or voter turnout of less than
50% ... during specified Presidential elections. When this formula is not met in an entire State,
coverage is triggered in any 'political subdivision' within the State that satisfies the formula."
Bd of Commr's, 435 U.S. at 119-20.
74. City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 128-29 (1983). Addressing the
definition of"change," the Supreme Court noted:
In order to determine whether an election practice constitutes a "change" as that
term is defined in our § 5 precedents, we compare the practice with the covered
jurisdiction's "baseline." We have defined the baseline as the most recent practice that
was both precleared and "in force or effect"-or, absent any change since the
jurisdiction's coverage date, the practice that was "in force or effect" on that date.
Riley v. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 1970, 1982 (2008). In explaining the rationale for the preclearance
procedure, the Court reasoned that "Congress realized that existing remedies were inadequate to
[guarantee the Fifteenth Amendment] and drafted an unusual, and in some aspects a severe,
procedure for insuring that States would not discriminate on the basis of race in the enforcement
of their voting laws." Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556 (1969).
75. SeeBd. ofComm'rs,435U.S.at 136.
76. Id. at 136. The requirement that proposed alterations not be discriminatory "serve[s] to
'shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims."' Riley,
128 S. Ct. at 1978 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966)) (explaining
the purpose of charging the jurisdiction with the burden of preclearance).
77. See City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 468 (1987); see also Bd of
Comm'rs, 435 U.S. at 127 ("[T]he substantive duties imposed in the Act ... apply not only to
governmental entities formally acting in the name of the State, but also to those political units
that may exercise control over critical aspects of the voting process"). But see City of Combes v.
E. Rio Hondo Water Supply Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 778, 782 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (per curiam)
(holding that Texas Law does not recognize a municipal water authority as a political unit "for
purposes of the Voting Rights Act").
78. City of Combes, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 780 (reasoning that "states could avoid coverage by
delegating decisions regarding electoral policy to entities that state law does not characterize as
'political subdivision[s].' (quoting Bd. ofComm"rs, 435 U.S. at 139 (Powell, J., concurring))).
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because the utility company exercises governmental authority and is financed
by municipal funds.
79
2. How Preclearance Is Granted
Prior approval for preclearance may be granted by one of two methods: (1)
seeking a declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia "that the changes do not have the purpose and will not
have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race" or
(2) filing the change with the Attorney General, who is given sixty days to
80
object to the plan. Preclearance will be granted if the change "neither has the
purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color."81
3. Failure to Comply and the Overall Effectiveness of Preclearance
While funding for enforcement has increased, this initiative does not
necessarily translate into compliance.82 The Supreme Court has observed that
there is "widespread noncompliance" with preclearance provisions.
83
Similarly, Congress has observed that the Department of Justice has no method
84
in place to monitor states and thus cannot make sure all changes are reported.
79. See id ("[F]ederal courts should examine how precisely, the entity at question is
treated-rather than merely defined-in the context of the pertinent state's law of
intergovernmental relations."); ef Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410
U.S. 719, 728-29 (1973) (finding that a water-storage district was not in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause because it had "relatively limited authority...
[and provided] no other general public services such as schools, housing, transportation, utilities,
roads, or anything else of the type ordinarily financed by a municipal body").
80. City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 128-29 (1983). Congress has provided
the financial resources needed by the Department of Justice to oversee the substantial undertaking
of monitoring the preclearance procedure. See generally U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
FUNDING FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT: THE PRESIDENT'S 2006 REQUEST,
Introduction (2005), http://eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content storage_01/00000
19b/80/28/0e/3f.pdf [hereinafter COMMISSION] (discussing the substantial funding needed for
civil rights enforcement). Out of six federal agencies with supervision of civil rights programs,
the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division had the largest funding increase from 1994 to
2005, with its annual budget growing 79.6% to a recent total of $110,437,000 in fiscal year 2006.
Id. at Intro. & Ch. 4.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006).
82. See supra note 80; Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d
221, 256 (D.D.C. 2008), rev'd on other grounds, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (U.S. 2009) (citing McCain v.
Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 249 (1984)).
83. Nw. Austin Mun., 573 F. Supp. 2d at 256.
84. H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 41 (2006), reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 618, 646
(remarking that the lack of a method for monitoring states has resulted in "many defiant covered
jurisdictions and state and local officials continu[ing] to enact and enforce changes to voting
procedures without the Federal Government's knowledge").
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Despite its shortcomings, preclearance has been hailed as a "vital
prophylactic tool" that subtly impedes discriminatory changes. 85 Furthermore,
jurisdictions that fail to seek preclearance are subject to judicial reprimand.
86
If a jurisdiction does not seek prior approval for voting changes, the Attorney
General or a private citizen may sue to require preclearance pursuant to § 5.
s7
Courts have prevented the execution of the non-precleared changes by issuing
88injunctions halting implementation. Thus, while compliance is not absolute,
the Voting Rights Act nonetheless serves to prevent discriminatory changes to
voting laws. 89
4. The Constitutionality of Preclearance: Historical and Modern
Challenges
The Supreme Court has established a framework for evaluating the
constitutionality of statutes authorized under the Fourteenth Amendment. In
1966, the Supreme Court, in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, upheld the
constitutionality of the "extraordinary" 90 preclearance provision, proclaiming
that "Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional
prohibition of racial discrimination in voting"91-the rationality test. Although
South Carolina v. Katzenbach applied to protections based on the Fifteenth
Amendment,92 shortly thereafter Katzenbach v. Morgan used the rationality
test to uphold sections of the Voting Rights Act passed under the enabling
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
93
In City of Boerne v. Flores, however, the Supreme Court reined in
Congress's ability to pass legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment, stating
"this 'power is . . . not unlimited.' 94  Rather, the Court required that the
statutory remedy be both "congruen[t]" with and "proportional" to the injury.
95
85. Nw. Austin Mun., 573 F. Supp. 2d at 265.
86. Id. at 256.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Lopez v. Monterey County, 519 U.S. 9, 20 (1996) ("If a voting change subject
to § 5 has not been precleared, § 5 plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction prohibiting
implementation of the change.").
89. See Nw. Austin Mun., 573 F. Supp. 2d at 264-75 (underscoring the deterrent value of
sanctions).
90. Beatty v. Esposito, 439 F. Supp. 830, 832 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (describing the preclearance
procedure as an "extraordinary measure").
91. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966) (upholding the
constitutionality of the preclearance provision under the Fifteenth Amendment).
92. Id. at 337 ("We here hold that the portions of the Voting Rights Act properly before us
are a valid means for carrying out the commands of the Fifteenth Amendment.").
93. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646-47 (1966); see also Nw. Austin Mun., 573 F.
Supp. 2d at 237.
94. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997) (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112, 128 (1970)).
95. ld. at 520.
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On July 27, 2006, Congress extended the provisions of the Voting Rights
Act for another twenty-five years, 9 6 prompting another constitutional challenge
that was recently heard by the Supreme Court. 97  In Northwest Austin
Municipal Utility District Number One v. Mukasey, the District Court for the
District of Columbia held that Congress's 2006 decision to extend the Voting
Rights Act was rational, and thus constitutional, under the rationality standard
announced in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.98 The court determined that the
Katzenbach rational test was the appropriate standard because preclearance
implicates both freedom from racial discrimination and voting, two essential
rights that justify statutory protection. 99 The court went further, finding the
extension of the law valid under the more stringent City of Boerne
"congruen[t]" and "proportional" standard. 00 In reaching this conclusion, the
court used a strict level of scrutiny and examined the violation for which the
legislation was designed to remedy, noting that "any § 5 legislation 'must be
judged with reference to the historical experience.., it reflects.""
01
In an eight-to-one decision reviewing Northwest Austin Municipal, the
Supreme Court avoided a complete constitutional analysis of § 5 of the Votin
Rights Act but, nevertheless, upheld the law's preclearance provision.
However, without making a decision, the Court openly questioned whether the
political and racial circumstances necessitating the Voting Rights Act continue
to exist today. 0 3  Recognizing the constitutional significance of allowing
jurisdictions to remove themselves from the preclearance regime, the Court
held that governments must be afforded the option to "bail out" of the
preclearance requirements.' 
04
96. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-246, § 7, 120 Stat. 577, 581 (2006);
see also Nw. Austin Mun., 573 F. Supp. 2d at 229.
97. See Robert Barnes, Voting Rights Act Upheld, But Court Hints at Change, WASH. POST,
June 23, 2009, at Al.
98. Nw. Austin Mun., 573 F. Supp. 2d at 223-24 (reasoning that the legislative history
showed ample evidence of racial discrimination and that the extension of § 5 coverage was a
rational means to prevent racial discrimination in contemporary voting procedures).
99. Id. at 245.
100. Id. at 224 ("Given Section 5's tailored remedial scheme, the extension [of the Voting
Rights Act] qualifies as a congruent and proportional response to the continuing problem of racial
discrimination in voting.").
101. Id at 269-70 (quoting Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say.
Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639-40 (1999)) (omission in original).
102. Nw. Austin Mun. v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2508 (2009); see also Barnes, supra note
97.
103. Nw. Austin Mun., 129 S. Ct. at 2511-12 (observing that the discrimination prompting §
5 "may no longer be concentrated in the jurisdictions singled out for preclearance" and that "there
is considerable evidence that [the law] fails to account for current political conditions").
104. Id. at 2516; see Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.
com/wp/section-5-survives-2/ (June 22, 2009, 10:11 EST).
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Perhaps in anticipation of these constitutional pressures, legislation has
begun to include exit procedures that no longer make preclearance
requirements absolute.'
0 5
5. Sunset for Discrimination? Exit Options and Defining an End Date for
Federal Programs
When Congress extended the preclearance requirements of the Voting
Rights Act for twenty-five years in 2006, it justified the period of extension by
reasoning that the law responded to nearly a century of discrimination. 0 6 The
Northwest Austin Municipal court declared this a legislative policy
determination not subject to judicial review.' Similarly, in Grutter v.
Bollinger, the Supreme Court observed that provisions to remedy racial
disparity in the context of a higher-education admissions process must have a
"termination point," and thus suggested a twenty-five-year sunset provision for
race-conscious provisions.
0 8
In addition to the limitation of the statute's twenty-five-year sunset, the
preclearance requirements of the Voting Rights Act are not absolute. 0 9 The
statute includes a "bailout" provision that permits jurisdictions falling under
preclearance requirements but without recent violations to remove themselves
from § 5 obligations by seeking a declaratory judgment in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia.'10 In order for the court to approve
such a declaratory judgment, the jurisdiction must show that "during the past
ten years they used no test or device, were the subject of no judicial findings of
racial discrimination in voting, successfully precleared all voting changes, and
engaged in constructive efforts to eliminate intimidation and harassment of
voters. ' 111  Essentially, showing good behavior for a ten-year period will
relieve a previously monitored jurisdiction from the compliance requirements
of§ 5.112
105. Nw. Austin Mun., 573 F. Supp. 2d at 226 (outlining bailout provisions for the
preclearance requirements); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342-43 (2003)
(discussing "sunset provisions" in race-conscious university admissions policies).
106. H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 57-58 (2006); Nw. Austin Mun., 573 F. Supp. 2d at 229
(referencing the conclusions of Congress-that discrimination in voting practices extends into
present day).
107. Nw. Austin Mun., 573 F. Supp. 2d at 267-68. The Supreme Court showed similar
deference, stating that finding a federal law "unconstitutional is the 'most delicate' task"--a task
that the Court refused to undertake upon reviewing the case. Barnes, supra note 97 (quoting Nw.
Austin Mun., 129 S. Ct. at 2513).
108. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342-43.
109. Nw. Austin Mun., 573 F. Supp. 2d at 230.
110. Id at 230-31.
Ill. Id. at 228.
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(2)-(4) (2006) (articulating the mechanisms for bailout of § 5
requirements).
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G. The Current State of the Law: Remedies for Violations ofAnti-
Discrimination Provisions
Courts have awarded various remedies in response to violations of federal
anti-discrimination statutes, including damages 113 and injunctions. 114  The
Supreme Court has also authorized Congress's ability to pass legislation to
prevent violations of the Fourteenth Amendment that are frequently alleged in
municipal-service equalization cases.11 5  In addition to judicially granted
remedies, the Voting Rights Act represents a federal-review mechanism
designed to protect the Fifteenth Amendment right to vote.
116
II. SEARCHING FOR EQUALITY IN THE OHIO HILLS: THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY
OF KENNEDY V. CITY OF ZANESVILLE
The process of defining and defending these constitutional rights came into
focus when twenty-five citizens of Washington Township, Ohio--the area
surrounding Coal Run-filed a complaint with the Ohio Civil Rights
Commission (OCRC) on July 26, 2002.117 After observing that the Township
granted water access to white residents while simultaneously denying water
access to African American residents, the OCRC found probable cause of
racial motivation.liB
113. See, e.g., Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1986) (stating
that damages are an appropriate remedy for a § 1983 violation but stressing that actual injury is
required in order for compensatory damages to be awarded); see also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S.
247, 264 (1978) (ruling that compensatory damages are available for mental and emotional injury
caused by a § 1983 violation but only with "proof that such injury actually was caused").
114. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286, 1293 (5th Cir. 1971) (condemning
the town's discriminatory action and mandating a proposal to eliminate discrimination in
municipal services provision).
115. See, e.g., Hawkins, 437 F.2d at 1287-88 (granting injunctive relief under § 1983 in
order to vindicate plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from racial discrimination in
the distribution of municipal services); Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 101 F.2d 774, 788 (3d
Cir. 1939), modified, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (observing that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was "enacted
originally to enforce recognition by the states of the civil rights secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment").
116. See Berry v. Doles, 438 U.S. 190, 199-200 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (commenting
that § 5 of the Voting Rights Act was designed to protect "an important constitutional right"-the
right to vote); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XV ("The right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude.").
117. See Kennedy v. City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d 456, 463, 477 (S.D. Ohio 2007)
(noting that Coal Run is a "neighborhood located within [Muskingum] County and [Washington]
Township").
118. See Dao, supra note 9 (reporting that OCRC concluded that two white homes on Coal
Run Road--one located within 200 yards of the African American community-and eighteen
white homes on neighboring Langan Lane had access to city water while the seventeen African
American or mixed-race homes on Coal Run Road did not).
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Sixty-eight individual plaintiffs then filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio, listing defendants as: the City of
Zanesville, Muskingum County, Washington Township, "and individual
elected officials from the County and Township." ' 1 9  Seeking remedies of
damages, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief, the plaintiffs filed a
complaint on November 13, 2003, claiming violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1982, 1983, 2000d, the Fair Housing Act, and an Ohio civil rights statute.
1 20
Both sides filed motions for summary judgment. 121 The court granted the
plaintiffs' motion, finding Muskingum County liable for discriminatory actions
of the East Muskingum Water Authority. 122  The defendants' motions for
summary judgment argued lack of plaintiffs' standing, expiration of the statute
of limitations, failure to prove a prima facie case of discrimination under
McDonnell Douglas, and that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the
equitable doctrines of laches and estoppel. 123  The court rejected these
arguments and dismissed Washington Township from the case.' The court
then heard oral argument on June 4, 2007, and issued its opinion on the
summary judgment motions on September 7, 2007.125
On July 10, 2008, one year after summary judgment oral argument, two
months after being sworn in, and after two weeks of deliberation, the jury
delivered a verdict. 126 The jury found that the City and County had unlawfully
119. City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 463.
120. Id. at 476; supra note 21 and accompanying text.
121. City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 463.
122. Id. at 480 (determining that a "de facto merger" had occurred between the County and
the municipal water authority and thus the County was liable for the water authority's actions).
123. Id. at 483. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment on all of plaintiffs' claims
on March 14, 2007. Plaintiffs filed a "Combined Response in Opposition to Defendants' motions
along with a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment" on April 23, 2007. Id. at 477.
124. Id. at 501. In reaching its conclusion, the court engaged in a fact-intensive analysis of
the township's actions during the history of water denials. As a preliminary matter, the court
noted that "in order to have standing, a plaintiff must have suffered injury that is fairly traceable
to the challenged action of the defendant." Id. at 484 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499
(1975)) (emphasis omitted). For example, plaintiff Jerry Kennedy stated that he requested water
from Township Trustee Doug Culbertson; however, the court ultimately found that the
conversation between Kennedy and Culbertson was an inquiry, not a request. Id. at 485 n.14.
Most critically, the court found that the decisions about water access were not made by the
Township. Id. at 486 ("The Township never had the ability to provide [p]laintiffs, or anyone else,
with water."). Accordingly, the court dismissed the Township as a defendant in the action
because its actions did not result in the denial of water service to the plaintiffs. Id. at 487
(granting the Township's summary judgment motion).
125. Id. at 477.
126. See U.S. District Court Civil Docket, Nos. 420-36, City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d
456 (No. 2:03cv 1047) (noting that the jury was sworn in on May 12, 2008, issued instructions and
sent into deliberation on June 26, 2008, and delivered a verdict on July 10, 2008); Kathy
Thompson, Coal Run Road Water Bill: $10.8 Million, ZANESVILLE TIMES RECORDER, July 11,
2008, at IA.
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discriminated and it awarded plaintiffs nearly $1 1 million in damages.' 2 ' Both
the City and County filed post-judgment motions seeking relief from the
verdict, arguing that the improper participation of an altemate juror was
grounds for a new trial, 128 and similarly claiming that the plaintiffs failed to
127. See Johnson, supra note 7 (reporting that plaintiffs would individually receive anywhere
from $15,000 to $300,000). According to plaintiffs' attorney Reed Colfax, the responsibility for
paying the awarded damages was divided between the water authority, the County, and the City.
Julie Carr Smyth, Jury: Black Neighborhood Was Denied Water Service, THE ASSOCIATED
PRESS (July 10, 2008), available at http://www.truthout.org/article/racial-discrimination-ohio-
neighborhood-denied-water-service (indicating that the damages awarded to plaintiffs "covered
both monetary losses and the residents' pain and suffering between 1956, when water lines were
first laid in the area, and 2008 when Coal Run got public water"). The water authority was
responsible for fifty-five percent of the damages, the County owed twenty-five percent, and the
City owed twenty percent. Id. The water authority no longer exists, however, and the County is
now responsible for paying that portion of the damages. Id
Because City of Zanesville is a jury verdict, there is not a complete record to review, but
studies have indicated that jurors' attitudes may be impacted by the type of defendant involved.
See EDIE GREENE & BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN, DETERMINING DAMAGES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
JURY AWARDS 70 (2003). One example is the "deep pockets effect," which refers to the idea that
jurors are more likely to award higher damages against defendants with the ability to pay.
Monica K. Miller, How Juryphobia and Fears of Fraudulent Claims Disserve Medical
Malpractice Reform Efforts, in CIVIL JURIES AND CIVIL JUSTICE 175, 178 (B.H. Bomstein et al.
eds., 2008). Specifically, scholars have observed the "deep pockets effect" to situations where
the government is the defendant. See Neil Vidmar, Empirical Evidence on the Deep Pockets
Hypothesis: Jury Awards for Pain and Suffering in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE L.J.
217, 220 (1993) (finding that the deep pockets effect extended to "government defendants"). One
study found that plaintiffs suing the government had a 48% chance of prevailing, higher than
plaintiffs alleging malpractice (a 33% success rate), or plaintiffs suing in products liability cases
(a 44% success rate). GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra, at 73 (citing a 1991 study). Another study
found that government defendants received damage penalties 15% higher than corporations and
50% higher than individuals. Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior
of the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not? 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1275 n.493 (1992).
128. See U.S. District Court Civil Docket, supra note 126, at Nos. 444, 447-48. The County
filed a Motion for Mistrial and notice of appeal. Id. at No. 446. The City filed a Motion for a
New Trial and/or Motion for Relief from Judgment. Thompson, supra note 15. The City also
filed a Motion for a Judgment as a Matter of Law, and a Motion to Stay Execution on Judgment
Without Bond. See U.S. District Court Civil Docket, supra note 126, at Nos. 447-49. Attorneys
for the city argued that a juror was not able to complete deliberations because of health issues.
See Thompson, supra note 15. The parties disagreed as to whether an alternate juror should
replace the sick juror and the judge decided against using an alternate. Id City attorneys then
asserted that despite the court's ruling, an alternate juror had deliberated for approximately fifteen
to twenty minutes, and that such participation justifies a new trial under Sixth Circuit precedent.
Id.
Relative to other circuits, the Sixth Circuit applies a more expansive standard when
determining whether the participation of alternate jurors is grounds for a new trial. See, e.g.,
Hanson v. Parkside Surgery Ctr., 872 F.2d 745, 749 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that a district court's
use of an eight-member jury was not reversible error, despite the mandating of a six-member
jury). On the other hand, the "Second, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh [Circuits] agree
that reversal is required ... where an alternate juror actually participates in the jury deliberations
without the consent of counsel." Cabral v. Sullivan, 961 F.2d 998, 1003 (1st Cir. 1992). The
Sixth Circuit deemed alternate juror participation "harmless error" where a substantial right is not
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satisfy the burden of proof in establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination. 129 On March 5, 2009, the plaintiffs settled with the City and
County, ending the appeal process and resulting in a $9.6 million dollar award
to be split among the plaintiffs. 130
III. AN UNCOMFORTABLE ANACHRONISM: GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED RACISM
AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF KENNEDY V. CITY OF ZANESVILLE
This historic lawsuit was set in the sparsely populated hills of southeast
Ohio.' 31 The City of Zanesville has a population of approximately 25,361,132
and Muskingum County has a population of 85,087.1 33 Although
approximately 85% of Coal Run residents are African American, 134 African
Americans comprise only 4.0% of the population of Muskingum County.
35
violated. Hanson, 872 F.2d at 749-50. In light of the less stringent standard applied in the Sixth
Circuit, the alternate juror deliberating for a matter of fifteen to twenty minutes was unlikely to
have caused significant harm to defendants' rights and a court would be unlikely to find the
alternate juror's deliberation grounds for a new trial.
Post-trial, defendants also characterized the case as a greedy grab for legal fees by out-of-town
lawyers. Thompson, supra note 126. In addressing such an assertion, the Sixth Circuit applies
localizing factors in order to ensure that out-of-state attorneys are compensated in amounts
appropriate to local legal rates. See Brian A. v. Hattaway, 83 F. App'x 692, 694 (6th Cir. 2003)
(articulating the Sixth Circuit test for finding the prevailing market rate of attorney fees).
However, there is flexibility in this standard if the selection of the "out-of-town" specialist was
"reasonable" and "if the rates sought by the out-of-town specialist are reasonable for an attorney
of his or her degree of skill, experience, and reputation." Brian A., 83 F. App'x at 694 (citing
Hadix v. Johnson, 65 F.3d 532, 535 (6th Cir. 1995)).
Given the flexibility in rates permitted by Sixth Circuit jurisprudence, the defendants' claims
that the "case has always been about out-of-state lawyers taking advantage of a situation" and that
they are putting their hands "in the pockets of the hardworking people of Muskingum County" are
likely unfounded. Thompson, supra note 126.
129. Memorandum in Support of Motion of Defendant, City of Zanesville for Judgment as a
Matter of Law at 2, Kennedy v. City of Zanesville, No. 2:2003cv01047 (S.D. Ohio July 31,
2008).
130. See Randy Ludlow, Coal Run Residents Settle for $9.6 Million, COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
Mar. 6, 2009, at B 1.
131. City of Zanesville, Ohio, supra note 2.
132. U.S. Census Bureau, Zanesville(city), Ohio, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/39/
3988084.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2010) (estimated in 2006).
133. U.S. Census Bureau, Muskingum County, Ohio, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/
39/39119.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2010) (estimated in 2008).
134. See Kennedy v. City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d 456, 463 (S.D. Ohio 2007).
135. U.S. Census Bureau, Muskingum County, Ohio, supra note 133.
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Municipal water service is not universal in Muskingum County. 136 Only an
estimated 52,900 out of 85,087 county residents have municipal water.1
37
Unfortunately, digging a well is not a safe alternative in many areas because
coal mines in the surrounding area have contaminated the water table,
rendering it non-potable. 138 Consequently, until municipal water was installed
in 2004, Coal Run residents sought alternatives varying from expensive to
frontier-like, such as collecting rainwater and melting snow.39
The timing of City of Zanesville is highly significant. The facts and
storyline of a local government racially discriminating against a group of
residents is reminiscent of issues common during the Civil Rights Era.
140
Although systematic racial discrimination is often characterized as a past
problem in the United States, the City of Zanesville court recently ruled in
plaintiffs' favor, endorsing the view that the City employed a "policy, pattern,
and practice of denying public water service .. .to the individual Plaintiffs
during the last fifty years because they are African American and!or because
they reside in a predominantly African American neighborhood,"' 14 1 which
continued until discrimination complaints were filed in 2002.142 In 2004, the
same year that then-Illinois State Senator Barack Obama-the first African
American President of the United States--emerged on the national scene at the
136. See Brian Gadd, Water, Water Everywhere?, ZANESVILLE TIMES RECORDER, July 20,
2008, at IA [hereinafter Gadd, Water] (noting that "approximately half of the county's residents
who live in unincorporated areas of the county ... lack access to public water"). Inadequate
water infrastructure, a problem commonly associated with the developing world, is a problem not
only in Muskingum County but also in other United States communities. Anderson, supra note 6,
at 1106-07. For example, the Texas Water Development Board estimates that over a million
Texas residents require water-system upgrades that would cost an estimated $4.5 billion. Id. at
1105. In February 2009, a local Zanesville newspaper reported that the City of Zanesville
submitted for inclusion in the national economic stimulus package a $17.3 million request, $9
million of which would go towards a new water-treatment facility. Brian Gadd, City Seeking
$1 7M in Stimulus Funding, ZANESVILLE TIMES RECORDER, Feb. 10, 2009, at 3A.
137. Gadd, Water, supra note 136; U.S. Census Bureau, Muskingum County, Ohio, supra
note 133.
138. Suddath, supra note I (explaining that although the coal mines are closed, sulfur
remaining in the soil turns the water red).
139. Dao, supra note 9 (noting that by purchasing water, Coal Run residents spent five to ten
times more money on water than other area residents); see also Johnson, supra note 7 (discussing
one family's method of using an electric pump to bring water into the house, even though the
water was contaminated).
140. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (holding unconstitutional the
racial segregation of children in public schools). The Brown decision has been characterized as
"a catalyst in launching the modern Civil Rights movement." Brown Foundation for Educational
Equity, Brown vs. Board of Education-About the Case, http://www.brownvboard.org/summary/
index.php (last visited Feb. 14, 2010).
141. Kennedy v. City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d 456, 463 (S.D. Ohio 2007).
142. Id. at 469.
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Democratic National Convention, 143 Muskingum County, Ohio extended water
to the largely African American residents of Coal Run. 144
The recent timing of City of Zanesville delivers a poignant reminder of race-
based inequality and an important race discrimination case that may shape the
course of Civil Rights jurisprudence.
45
IV. STATUTORY RELIEF IS NEEDED TO COMPENSATE FOR SOCIAL
DIVISIVENESS CAUSED BY GOVERNMENT RACE DISCRIMINATION
The jury in City of Zanesville determined correctly that the County and City
unlawfully discriminated in its allocation of municipal services; but a jury
verdict alone is not sufficient. In order to penalize and deter discriminatory
conduct by local and state governmental entities, a new federal law should be
enacted that would require government bodies found liable for discrimination
143. See generally Barack Obama, 2004 Democratic National Convention keynote Address
(July 27, 2004), available at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/convention2004/barack
obama2004dnc.htm.
144. City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 469.
145. In the early race discrimination case of Korematsu v. United States, the Supreme Court
announced the strict scrutiny standard for addressing claims of race discrimination, stating that
"all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately
suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny." Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944), superseded by statute, Adaranol Constr. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 215 (1995). In the context
of higher education and race, Brown v. Board of Education is distinguished from prior education
race cases because it directly addressed and rejected the concept of separate but equal. Brown,
347 U.S. at 493. In Brown, Chief Justice Earl Warren proclaimed that the method of separate but
equal is unconstitutional and causes harm to minority school children. Id. The Brown decision
has been recognized as "among the most significant judicial turning points in the development of
our country" and a case that "laid the foundation for shaping future national and international
policies regarding human rights." Brown Foundation for Educational Equity, supra note 140.
Brown was not the first school segregation case; rather, it was preceded by litigation as early as
1849. 1d. However, Brown had a significant impact on the history and law of the United States
and triggered racial reform in schools around the country. Id.
The Court again addressed race in the context of education relatively recently in the landmark
affirmative action cases involving the consideration of race in the admissions process for the
University of Michigan law program. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311 (2003). In Grutter,
the Court held that diversity is a compelling government interest and, after applying strict
scrutiny, upheld the law school admission program as narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.
Id; see also Blend It, Don't End It: Affirmative Action and the Texas Ten Percent Plan After
Grutter and Gratz, 8 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 33, 37 (2005). Simultaneously, the Supreme Court
announced Gratz v. Bollinger, in which the Court declared the University of Michigan
undergraduate admissions program was unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored.
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270-71 (2003).
Another landmark civil rights case is Loving v. Virginia, a case in which the Supreme Court
addressed a Virginia law banning interracial marriage. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967).
At the time, Virginia was one of sixteen states that prohibited interracial marriages. Id. at 6. The
Loving Court struck down the law and affirmed that "[t]he clear and central purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial
discrimination in the States." Id. at 10.
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to justify denials or adjustments of service through preclearance requirements
monitored by the federal government.
A. Denials of Service Were Racially Motivated
Several indicators in City of Zanesville show that the jury correctly
recognized the correlation between race and the lack of municipal water
service for Coal Run residents.14 6  In bringing their allegations, Coal Run
residents followed the Hawkins model 147 of citing statistical discrepancies in
the residents with access to municipal water supply.14 8  For example, one
report noted that
on Coal Run Road, none of the 17 black or mixed-race homes had
city water service, while two white homes did. On nearby Langan
Lane, all of the 18 white homes on top of the hill had city water,
while five of the eight black or mixed-race homes in the hollow did
not. (The other three families had connected to the municipal lines
by themselves.). 
149
The facts of City of Zanesville also mirror prior successful municipal-service
equalization cases.r5  The plaintiffs satisfied the Johnson requirements 15 1 for
showing discrimination in a municipal service context. Because Coal Run is a
majority African American community in a majority white county, the first
Johnson prong is satisfied by the existence of a racially identifiable
neighborhood. Second, there was substantial inferiority in the provision of
services because white residents had municipal water while African American
residents did not, a disparity that satisfies the second Johnson element. 53 The
third Johnson element-showing discriminatory intent or motive by the City-
is met by applying the Dowdell factors.
146. City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 463-69.
147. See Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286, 1288 (5th Cir. 1971). Plaintiffs in City
of Zanesville followed the Hawkins model by presenting statistical evidence of geographic
segregation, noting that Coal Run is comprised of 85% African American residents. City of
Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 463. In contrast, Muskingum County is comprised of 93.7% white
residents. U.S. Census Bureau, Muskingum County, Ohio, supra note 133.
148. See Dao, supra note 9 (observing that white homes on Coal Run Road and Langan Lane
had access to city water while nearby African American or mixed-race homes did not).
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., Hawkins, 437 F.2d at 1288; see also supra Part I.C. (highlighting municipal-
service equalization cases).
151. Johnson v. City of Arcadia, 450 F. Supp. 1363, 1379 (M.D. Fla. 1978); see also supra
text accompanying note 43. In City of Zanesville, the quality of service afforded to African
American residents was substantially inferior to that afforded to white homes-the former had no
water, while the latter were provided service. Dao, supra note 9. As in Johnson, the City of
Zanesville court can infer discriminatory intent, because plaintiffs identified geographically
segregated housing patterns and corresponding inequalities in city services. City of Zanesville,
505 F. Supp. 2d at 464.
152. City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 463; supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
153. See generally Dao, supra note 9.
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The Dowdell factors for finding discriminatory intent are also satisfied.154
Similar to Dowdell, in City of Zanesville there was a significant disparity in the
quality of services-the lack of reliable running water critically affected the
lives of Coal Run residents.1 55 Further, there was a pattern of discriminatory
decision-making for decades, as residents of Coal Run had been requesting
access to the city water supply since the 1950s.156 An unequal provision of
services was a foreseeable outcome of the City's actions because providing
water to one group of people while denying it to another, as in City of
Zanesville, necessarily creates inequitable access.' 57  The same factors that
required a finding of discriminatory intent in Dowdell are thus satisfied under
the facts of City of Zanesville.
The standard for knowledge of the alleged discriminatory impact as
announced in Ammons 158 is also satisfied in City of Zanesville. This is
demonstrated through a March 2000 report by the City's water superintendent,
which showed that the defendants in City of Zanesville had knowledge for over
thirty-five years of denials of service to the residents of Coal Run.'
59
The grounds on which defendants appealed further indicate that the jury
correctly found race discrimination-the motions of both the City and the
County focus predominantly on procedural issues, rather than substantive
law. 16o
154. Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1186 (11 th Cir. 1983); see also supra text
accompanying note 47 (discussing the Dowdell factors). The Dowdell court held that the
following factors are "probative of discriminatory intent[:] ... the magnitude of disparity[;] ...
the legislative and administrative pattern of decision-making[;] .. .[and whether] the continued
and systematic relative deprivation of the black community was the obviously foreseeable
outcome" of the city's actions. Dowdell, 698 F.2d at 1186.
155. See Johnson, supra note 7.
156. See City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 465-66.
157. Ludlow, supra note 5 (reporting that "[s]urrounding white residents had public water"
even though Coal Run residents did not).
158. Ammons v. Dade City, 783 F.2d 982, 988 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that the city had
knowledge of discriminatory impact because "[a] brief visit to the black community makes
obvious the need for street paving and storm water drainage control").
159. Kennedy v. City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d 456, 496 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (noting that
"[f]or at least the last thirty-five years the residents of Coal Run ... approached various members
of the Zanesville Water Division as to the possibility of extending water into their
neighborhood").
160. See Memorandum in Support of Motion of Defendant, City of Zanesville, for Judgment
as a Matter of Law at 3-11, Kennedy v. City of Zanesville, No. C2-03-1047 (S.D. Ohio July 31,
2008). The City dedicated eight pages in the beginning of its Motion for a Judgment as a Matter
of Law to mostly procedural issues, such as the statute of limitations, while spending just five
pages at the end of the brief claiming that plaintiffs did not sufficiently establish the elements of
their claim. Id. at 11-16. Similarly, the City's Motion for a New Trial and/or Relief From
Judgment focused exclusively on the improper participation of an alternate juror. See
Memorandum in Support of Defendant City of Zanesville's Motion for New Trial and/or Relief
From Judgment at 2-4, Kennedy v. City of Zanesville, No. C2-03-1047 (S.D. Ohio July 31,
2008). The County's Motion for a New Trial also focused on improper alternate juror
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Racially derisive statements allegedly made by various government officials
also suggest that the denial of service was racially motivated. 6 1 For example,
plaintiff Nancy Kennedy overheard a water-authority representative say "those
n[- -] will never have running water."' 62 Plaintiff Cynthia Hairston found a
severed pig's head in her driveway when she began organizing her neighbors
to obtain water access.' 63 Although this act was not directly tied to the action
of the defendants, such occurrences are further evidence of the racially tense
environment in which this case was litigated. Taking into account the clear
racial undertones at play, it appears that the court in City of Zanesville
correctly found the defendants liable for unlawful racial discrimination in its
denial of water access to Coal Run residents.
B. Compensation for Unconstitutional Race Discrimination: Mandatory
Government Oversight is Necessary to Punish and Prevent Government
Discrimination
City of Zanesville is a straightforward application of substantive civil rights
law, with the compelling warning that steps must be taken to prevent such
discrimination in the future. To the extent that plaintiffs endured decades of
denials of water service based on their race, 64 increased health dangers caused
by the contamination of alternative water sources,' 65 and increased costs forsafe water, 66 plaintiffs sustained an actual injury and impairment of their
participation. Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial by Defendant Muskingum
County, No. C2-03-1047 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 2, 2008). The County's Motion for a Mistrial similarly
focused on evidentiary and procedural issues, rather than substantive law. See Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Mistrial by Defendant Muskingum County, Kennedy v. City of Zanesville,
No. C2-03-1047 (S.D. Ohio July 18, 2008).
161. See City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 466. Plaintiff Helen McCuen testified she and
other "Coal Run residents were told that 'they couldn't bring [water] out here, out our way."' Id.
Plaintiffs Jerry and Richard Kennedy testified that Commissioner Montgomery told them at a
2001 hearing that Coal Run "would not have water until the President dropped spiral bombs and
hopefully hit deep enough to hit good water." Id. at 468. Montgomery also allegedly stated that
"maybe Coal Run's great grandchildren would see water." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
162. Id. at 466.
163. Id. at 469 ("Plaintiffs claim that Ms. Hairston held numerous meetings with neighbors
about the lack of water, and on the morning of one of the meetings, she awoke to find a severed
pig's head in her driveway.").
164. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 7 (noting that some Coal Run residents, such as Jerry
Kennedy, lived without municipal water for over forty-five years).
165. See id (stating that water pulled from cisterns was "fouled with crawfish, snakes and
rats" as well as "residue from old coal deposits"); see also Anderson, supra note 6, at 1111
(observing that water cisterns attracted insects and snails).
166. See, e.g., Dao, supra note 9. By some estimates, Coal Run residents paid more than ten
times what recipients of city water paid for the in-home water service. Anderson, supra note 6, at
1111. Further, residents had increased insurance expenses because there was no reliable water for
firefighting purposes. Id. The problem is not limited to Coal Run-other minority communities
around the country have faced similar expenses as a result of not having access to city water. Id.
at 1100. For example, near Austin, Texas, poor residents in Northridge Acres pay twice the
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constitutional rights. 167  This constitutional violation warranted monetary
1 169 10171damages under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,' 1982, 1983, 7 and 2000d.
1. Precedent Shows Legislative Action Is Fundamental to Preventing
Discrimination
This case, and other aforementioned legal precedent, makes clear that new
legislation is urgently needed to prevent future transgressions by deterring
other localities from similar forms of discrimination. 172 Before settlement, the
City of Zanesville filed post-trial motions claiming the plaintiffs failed to prove
discrimination, 173 and indicating the City did not consider its actions unlawful.
expense for water than residents of the City of Austin. Id. Despite the increased cost to residents,
the water supply is polluted and limited. Id.
167. Courts have established that the Constitution is directly implicated when government
decisions impose disparate harm based on race. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Arcadia, 450 F.
Supp. 1363, 1378 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (ruling that a city must provide municipal services equally-
the failure to do so is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution-and
articulating standards by which courts determine whether municipal services are disbursed
equally). Such discriminatory government acts result in the tangible injury of a reduced quality
of life relative to people of other races. See id.; see also Suddath, supra note 1 ("[T]he feeling of
being treated like second-class citizens ... shouldn't happen today. We're supposed to be past
that."). Racism can have a significant impact on an individual's life; for example, one study
attributes increased high blood pressure in African Americans to the social stresses of racism.
See Aaron Levin, Racism, Anger Raise African Americans' Blood Pressure, Center for the
Advancement of Health (Oct. 17, 2003) http://www.cfah.org/hbns/news/racism 10-1 7-03.cfm.
Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas was born in Pin Point, Georgia and as a young child
he lived in a one-room house that lacked running water. See Notable Biographies, Clarence
Thomas Biography, http://www.notablebiographies.com/St-Tr/Thomas-Clarence.html (last
visited Feb. 14, 2010). Justice Thomas has reflected that racism caused him to drop out of
seminary shortly after enrolling and abandon his career goal of becoming a priest. Oyez, U.S.
Supreme Court Media, Clarence Thomas, http://www.oyez.org/justices/clarence_thomas/ (last
visited Feb. 14, 2010).
168. See, e.g., Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790, 798 (8th Cir. 2004)
(discussing § 1981, its provision for compensatory damages, and noting that Congress has not
limited the amount of damages under § 1981).
169. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hale, 13 F.3d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that the plaintiff
may receive compensatory damages for § 1982 violations).
170. See, e.g., Kemner v. Hemphill, 199 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1265 (N.D. Fla. 2002) (quoting
Slicker v. Jackson, 215 F.3d 1225, 1230 (11 th Cir. 2000)) (observing that compensatory damages
are permitted under § 1983 but they must be based on actual injury).
171. See Johnson v. City of Saline, 151 F.3d 564, 573 (6th Cir. 1998) (explaining that
compensatory damages are permitted under § 2000d). Damages are also permitted under a state
anti-discrimination law. See Cleveland v. Ibrahim, 1:01-cv-1582, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26348,
at *16 (N.D. Ohio May 29, 2003) (awarding compensatory damages for violation of Ohio
Revised Code § 4112.02(H)), rev'don other grounds, 121 F. App'x 881 (6th Cir. 2005).
172. See supra Part IV.A.
173. See City's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, supra note 160, at 2. The City filed
a Motion for a New Trial, citing several procedural and substantive issues in support of its
motion. Thompson, supra note 15. The substantive issue that the City asserted was that plaintiffs
failed to satisfy the burden of proof in establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See
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Thus, the City may again attempt to discriminate in the provision of essential
utilities to the thousands of county residents who still lack access to the
municipal water supply.
174
Muskingum County and other county and local governments must
understand that there are permanent consequences of unlawfully discriminating
based on race. Although deterrence can be hard to quantify, 175 testimony
before Congress has stated that the analogous Voting Rights Act preclearance
requirements "quietly but effectively deter[] discriminatory changes."'
7 6
Specifically, the testimony listed instances in which jurisdictions retreated
from making certain changes in voting policy or procedure upon learning they
would be received critically by the Department of Justice.177 City of Zanesville
shows that a law is needed to combat and deter racism, and congressional
testimony and prior law demonstrate that such laws can be effective. 78
2. The Proposed Scope of the Legislative Solution
Specifically, a new federal law passed under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Enabling Clause should require jurisdictions found to have
discriminated to seek preclearance from the Department of Justice before any
changes or denials to water and electric service. 179  The burden of
City's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, supra note 160, at 11-15. Addressing the prima
facie case for discrimination, the trial court initially employed the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting analysis. See Kennedy v. City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d 456, 497 (S.D. Ohio 2007).
The Supreme Court, however, has held that the McDonnell Douglas prima facie analysis is not
appropriate after the case goes to a jury, and thus the City's argument is not likely to hold
credence. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714-15 (1983) (ruling
that after a prima facie case is established and a case is considered by a factfinder, "the factfinder
must then decide whether the rejection was discriminatory within the meaning of Title VII. At
this stage, the McDonnell ... presumption drops from the case, and the factual inquiry proceeds
to a new level of specificity" (internal quotations omitted)).
174. Gadd, Water, supra note 136 (observing that half of the county's residents in
unincorporated areas do not have access to municipal water).
175. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221,264 (D.D.C.
2008) (discussing the deterrent effect), rev'd on other grounds, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
176. Id.
177. See id at 264-65 ("Elsewhere section 5's deterrent effect proved so potent that formal
objections were unnecessary to thwart discriminatory voting changes; all the Attorney General
had to do was indicate informally that preclearance was unlikely.").
178. See id. ("Beyond expert testimony, the record contains several concrete examples of
section 5 quietly but effectively deterring discriminatory changes. In some cases, jurisdictions
reacted to previous objections by altering their behavior."); cf H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 41
(2006) ("[M]any defiant covered jurisdictions and State and local officials continue to enact and
enforce changes to voting procedures without the Federal Government's knowledge.").
179. See U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."). But see Richard L. Hasen, Congressional
Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions of the Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane,
66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 177 (2005) ("As part of [the new federalism] revolution, the Court has
greatly restricted the ability of Congress to pass laws regulating the conduct of the states under its
enforcement powers granted in Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
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implementing this oversight program would be lessened by integrating it into
the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division-an existing department of the
federal government that traditionally receives more funding than other
agencies addressing civil rights issues.
180
The scope of this statute would be limited to reviewing state, county, and
local governments with a judicially established history of discrimination in the
provision of essential utilities such as water and electricity.' 81  More
specifically, to be bound by the requirements of preclearance, the government
entity would need to be found liable for violating 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982,
1983, or 2000d.' 82 The litigation finding discrimination should be final-the
appeals process must run its course before a jurisdiction would be subject to
preclearance.
3. Constitutionality and Duration of Oversight for Covered Jurisdictions
Courts have examined the duration of legislation in reference to the violation
it seeks to cure. 183 For example, § 5 of the Voting Rights Act's twenty-five-
year extension was found to be appropriate given the century-long history of
discrimination. 184  By analogy, jurisdictions monitored under this proposal
would be required to comply for fifteen years-reasonable, given the nearly
half-century of discrimination identified in City of Zanesville. 85 After fifteen
years, the requirements would sunset, in recognition of Grutter's mandate that
legislation must ultimately expire. 186 Similarly, this legislation would include
a bailout provision similar to that in the Voting Rights Act, so that jurisdictions
demonstrating conformity with preclearance and refraining from
180. See generally COMMISSION, supra note 80, at Introduction (observing that the
Department of Justice Civil Rights Division had the most substantial budget increase over the last
twelve years).
181. Cf Nw. Austin Mun., 573 F. Supp. 2d at 225 (restricting the applicability of the Voting
Rights Act to only the "states and political subdivisions with particularly egregious histories of
racial discrimination").
182. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006).
183. See Nw. Austin Mun., 573 F. Supp. 2d at 267-68 ("A final issue requires our
consideration: the length of the 2006 extension.").
184. Id. (describing Congress's decision to extend the preclearance provisions for another
twenty-five years as rational).
185. See Dao, supra note 9 (considering the impact on residents from lifetimes without
running water and quoting eighty-nine-year-old Helen McCuen, a fifty-seven-year resident of
Coal Run, as stating, "I never thought I'd live to see it").
186. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341-42 (2003) ("A core purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to do away with all governmentally imposed discrimination based on race.
Accordingly, race-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time. This requirement
reflects that racial classifications . . . may be employed no more broadly than the interest
demands." (internal citation omitted)).
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discriminating in municipal-service decisions for ten years would be able to
seek removal from the oversight requirements.'
8 7
The proposed legislation would also pass the congruence and proportionality
test announced in City of Boerne and Northwest Austin Municipal."' As in
Northwest Austin Municipal, the court in Cit of Zanesville identified a
constitutional right at issue: equal protection.' Also, the court in City of
Zanesville identified a pattern of constitutional violations.19 The limited
duration and bailout provisions that the court cited as indicative of congruence
and proportionality in Northwest Austin Municipal are also present in the
proposed legislation. 191 Additionally, when courts review statutes designed to
remedy race discrimination, judicial deference to Congress is at a maximum,
192
further justifying such legislation given the presence of extensive minority
discrimination in City of Zanesville.
The Supreme Court has upheld such massive enforcement mechanisms by
finding support in the Enforcement Clause of the Fifteenth Amendment.'
90
The Constitution similarly enables statutory enforcement of Equal Protection
guarantees in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 94  Applying this
enforcement mechanism to Fourteenth Amendment violations is necessary to
remedy the social harm stemming from governmental race-based
discrimination and to prevent repeat conduct by jurisdictions practicing
discrimination.
187. See Nw. Austin Mun., 573 F. Supp. 2d at 227-28 ("[C]overed jurisdictions seeking
bailout ... [must] demonstrate (among other things) that during the past ten years they used no
test or device, were the subject of no judicial findings of racial discrimination in voting,
successfully precleared all voting changes, and engaged in constructive efforts to eliminate
intimidation and harassment of voters.").
188. Id. at 268-70 (stating the City of Boerne requirements for the congruence and
proportionality test, but disagreeing with their applicability).
189. See id. at 242; Verdict Form, U.S. District Court Civil Docket No. 436, No.
2:03cv0 1047 (S.D. Ohio July 10, 2008).
190. Kennedy v. City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d 456, 463 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (recognizing
the plaintiffs' claim that the City, County, and water authority adhered to a "policy, pattern, and
practice of denying public water service" on the basis of race).
191. See Nw. Austin Mun., 573 F. Supp. 2d at 268-69 (setting out congruence and
proportionality requirements). The Supreme Court also focused on the importance of bailout
provisions, noting the municipal jurisdiction suing was qualified for a bailout from the law's
requirements. Barnes, supra note 97.
192. Nw. Austin Mun., 573 F. Supp. 2d at 270 (indicating that "the Court gives Congress
significant leeway to craft broad remedial prohibitions when fundamental rights or protected
classes are at stake").
193. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966) ("We here hold that the
portions of the Voting Rights Act properly before us are a valid means for carrying out the
commands of the Fifteenth Amendment.").
194. Nw. Austin Mun., 573 F. Supp. 2d at 237 ("Like section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment,
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress 'power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article."' (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5)).
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V. CONCLUSION
City of Zanesville is a modem statutory-rights case that evokes the vigorous
constitutional battles of the Civil Rights Era.195 To the residents of Coal Run
Road who were without municipal water as recently as five years ago,
however, racial discrimination is not in the past. This case reminds us that race
discrimination can prevent access to essential municipal services and
unchecked personal prejudices carry the potential to contaminate government
action.
The jury in City of Zanesville was correct in finding the City and County
liable for discrimination. Yet while courts continue to successfully adjudicate
race discrimination claims, 196 continued racism by our own governments
makes it urgently clear that the law must do more. The federal government
should expand its oversight to include supervision of jurisdictions with a
judicially established history of discriminating against minorities in the
provision of essential municipal services. Although such an oversight
mechanism may not be a silver bullet to ending all racial discrimination, it is
an effective internal safeguard and deterrent for governments that have shown
they need one.
By expanding oversight to municipal services, the law would both defend
the equality for which Jerry Kennedy and the residents of Coal Run have
fought for so long and advance the still unrealized dream of equal rights for
every citizen on every street in the United States.
195. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
196. United States district court judges have proved reliable and effective at responding to
racial disputes as they arise. For example, United States District Judge James Brady ended forty-
seven years of litigation over the desegregation of East Baton Rouge Parish Schools when he
"pushed the warring parties into more than a year of ultimately successful talks behind closed
doors." National Association for Neighborhood Schools, East Baton Rouge Case Ends with
Settlement Agreement, http://www.nans.org/eastbatonrouge.shtml (last visited Feb. 14, 2010);
Baton Rouge Area Chamber, EBR Desegregation Case's Finality Gets Attention (July 16, 2007),
http://www.brac.org/site.php?pagelD= 199&newslD=304.
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